This article traces a philosophical shift that opened the door to a new departure in eighteenth-century Spanish empire: a newly emerging sense that the slave trade and African slavery were essential to the wealth of nations. Contextualizing this ideological reconfiguration within mid-eighteenth century debates, this article draws upon the works of political economists and royal councilors in Madrid and puts them in conversation with the words and actions of individuals in and from Cuba, including people of African descent themselves. Because of the central place of the island in eighteenthcentury imperial rivalry and reform, as well as its particular demographic situation, Cuba served as a catalyst for these debates about the place of African slavery and the transatlantic slave trade in Spanish empire. Ultimately, between the mid-eighteenth century and the turn of the nineteenth, this new mode of thought would lead to dramatic transformations in the institution of racial slavery and Spanish imperial political economy. 
To European observers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spanish empire had become a model of what not to do. Although early generations of British and French explorers in the Americas sought to emulate the pursuit of Indian gold, the political theorists of Spain's rivals soon shunned what they perceived to be the fundamental errors of its expansion and governance. about the perceived nature of Spain's universal monarchy, and how best to remake it, there emerged a new understanding that African slavery and the slave trade were essential to the wealth of nations. This was coupled with the new conviction that slave-based economies required a different political economy than Spain had pursued until then.
As frequently as historians of colonial Latin America and Spanish Empire refer to the Bourbon reforms, they do not as often connect them to slavery or the slave trade. And yet the desire to reform the slave trade and expand slavery lay at the very heart of this impulse for "Enlightened" reform in Spain and Spanish America.4 In what was a dramatic departure from policies in place since the sixteenth century, starting in the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish state began actively and programmatically to promote and prioritize the West African trade in humans. From a position one government minister in 1752 had described as "with our eyes closed as to the manner of this traffic," Spanish authorities made a number of reforms both to expand the traffic in slaves under its own flag and to govern the growth of African slavery and the place of people of African descent in its overseas territories.5
So eager were Spanish authorities to promote this realm of commerce that the very first "free and unrestricted trade" technically permitted in Spanish empire was "free trade in slaves" and slaves only, declared in 1789. Not only were import duties on slaves removed but bounties were also introduced to give a reward per enslaved African that an importer brought in. This was a dramatic turn from a previously restrictive royal policy of monopoly contracts.6
Coming just two years before the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution in 1791, which destroyed the sugar industry in the world's then largest producer and drove up global prices, this new Spanish policy is usually seen as an inevitable concession in the face of increased contraband slave trading and burgeoning sugar boom in the Spanish Caribbean. In a series of influential articles, Dale Tomich has linked the expansion of slavery and the slave trade in Cuba, the leader of this boom, to structural transformations in global capitalism, as well as the introduction of foreign capital and new technologies from Britain and the u.s.7 As do many other historians, Tomich takes as the mouthpiece and architect of this new departure in Spanish political economy the Cuban sugar planter and lawyer Francisco de Arango y Parreño . A powerful lobbying force at the Spanish court, Arango penned his influential "Discurso sobre la agricultura de La Habana y métodos de fomentarla" in 1793. 8 However, the Spanish Crown actually began this shift earlier and much more consciously in an attempt to modernize its empire in a shifting climate of European competition. In Cuba and other Spanish American territories, state promotion of the African slave trade began in the mid-eighteenth century and was accompanied by a new departure in Spanish political and economic thought. This evolution in political thought was shaped less by Cuba's sugar elite of the 1790s and more by the conditions of military and economic rivalry predominant several decades earlier. It also took a different course in Spain than similar debates among its rivals. For example, at this same time, French physiocrats were denouncing slavery as economically backward, and Adam Smith was at least failing to endorse it.9 Indeed this particular stance was shaped by the distinct patterns of two and a half centuries of Spanish American colonialism and Madrid's own perceptions of the best and most efficacious means of catching up with its competitors.
Tracing the context for this new thinking back to mid-eighteenth century debates, this article draws upon the works of political philosophers and royal councilors in Madrid and puts them in conversation with the words and actions of individuals in and from Cuba, including people of African descent themselves. Because of the central place the island played in eighteenthcentury imperial rivalry and reform, Cuba served as a catalyst for these debates about the place of African slavery and the transatlantic slave trade in Spanish empire. As the work of Josep Fradera, Jorge Domínguez, Allan Kuethe, and G. Douglas Inglis has shown, the island was a testing ground for Bourbon reforms later exported throughout Spanish America.10 journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 Fradera argues that the British invasions of Manila and Havana during the Seven Years' War acted as primary catalysts for fiscal, military, and political reorganizations directly afterwards, even though projects of rejuvenation had started before. The discourse surrounding African slavery and the slave trade that emerged at this time was both emblematic and formative of new thinking about the nature of Spanish empire. Inspired by foreign models, this ideological reconfiguration was governed by a much older political rhetoric concerned with preserving, at least in theory, a sense of the unique relationship between the Spanish Crown and its African subjects. It also sought to distinguish Spanish empire from the European rivals it sought at the same time to emulate. While this discourse does not tell us much about the realities of the lives of the enslaved, it does reveal the origins of a philosophical shift that ultimately led to dramatic transformations in the institution of slavery and Spanish imperial political economy.
Spanish Political Thought at Mid-Eighteenth Century
Even today, historians sharply disagree in their characterizations of Spanish colonialism, particularly in its later stages. As described by such scholars as J.H. Elliott and Stanley and Barbara Stein, a traditional interpretation of the eighteenth century posits an empire in decline due to fiscal crisis at the center, increased competition from European rivals, and growing demands for local autonomy from creoles overseas.11 By contrast, a revisionist group of scholars has argued that Spanish imperial governance remained vital and tremendously lucrative up until the financial pressures and political ruptures of the Napoleonic wars and the invasion of Spain in 1808.12 In several recent studies, Gabriel Paquette has painted a rosy picture of "Enlightened reform" in Spanish empire as a process of creative emulation of its rival European powers and successful adaptation of commercial and political doctrines. 13 By the seventeenth century, Spanish political thinkers known as the arbitristas were already puzzling how Spain could be so poor with so much New World gold and silver. After the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, when Spain lost its European empire, the Crown and its ministers felt a new urgency to exploit better the growing wealth of overseas possessions. At this point, a number of Bourbon political reformers, known as the proyectistas, began combining the thinking of the seventeenth-century arbitristas with serious study of foreign models, as well as the writings of French and British political economists, in order to arrive at new roadmaps for Spanish empire.14 With the final settlement of Spain's European conflicts in the 1750s, the Spanish government was also able to devote more attention to American matters and trade. 15 The consensus among these Bourbon proyectistas, like the arbitristas before them, was that commerce, not conquest, and population growth, not precious metals, were the keys to national wealth. True wealth lay in the hard work and productivity of subjects devoting their lives to agriculture and manufacture, both regarded as anemic at the time in Spain and its overseas possessions. Population growth would not only develop economies and provide more tax revenue to the Crown, but also, conveniently, help Spain better possess and defend its vast territories from foreign encroachment. In this way, Spanish reformers were absorbing and adapting popular theories of such northern European thinkers as Josiah Child, Charles Davenant, François Véron de 16 Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, , and "Views from the South"; Shovlin, p. 310; Sophus Reinert, Translating Empire, José del Campillo y Cosío, Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América (Madrid: Imprenta de Benito Cano, 1789), pp. Both implicitly and explicitly, these writers were also comparing the perceived failures of Spain's governance over its overseas territories with the great successes of French and British colonization in the West Indies. In a manuscript that circulated in the 1740s, the government minister José del Campillo y Cosío pointed out that Barbados and Martinique had provided tremendous wealth to Britain and France. According to Campillo, the success of these islands came from focusing on settlement rather than conquests, promoting commerce and agriculture, and allowing subjects to enrich themselves, which in turn benefitted state treasuries.17
Given this new political climate in Spain, it follows that Cuba and other circum-Caribbean possessions began to have more salience. During the prior century, Spanish political reformers had been far more likely to discuss Mexico and Peru in their writings about the Americas. However, during the eighteenth century Spanish political theorists increasingly began to take the Caribbean into account. The first object of their attention was contraband. Given the encroachments of British, French, and Dutch settlements, the Caribbean presented a security challenge for the safe passage of American gold and silver to Spain. In the first half of the eighteenth century, officials in Spain, Guatemala, New Spain, and Peru warned of the danger of contraband siphoning the mineral wealth from Spanish empire and strengthening the colonial ventures of Spain's rivals.18 journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 vital role in the colonization of the Americas since the first free African arrived in Hispaniola as a member of Columbus's second voyage in 1494. They served alongside the conquistadors, and by 1600 Africans rivaled if not outnumbered Spaniards in New Spain.22 But despite the longevity of Spanish slaveholding and the centuries-long presence of people of African descent in Spanish America, the subjects of the Spanish Crown found themselves on the outside looking in on the tremendous riches being produced in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a new kind of economic model: the large scale sugar and slavery complex taking off first in Barbados and later, Jamaica, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Saint-Domingue. Not only were Spanish subjects not a part of this agricultural boom, but they also remained disenfranchised from the transatlantic African slave trade. Spain was the only major European power in the Americas to have no West African territorial possessions, since the Treaty of Tordesillas. Subsequently, it had no stake in a transatlantic slave trade increasingly perceived as critical to imperial competition and the production of wealth. Under the asiento system, the Crown limited the number of enslaved Africans foreign traders were allowed to bring to Spanish territories. In 1762 the influential government minister the Conde de Campomanes wrote, "the traffic in slaves in the West Indies is one of the objects of greatest attention there. Nevertheless [in Spain] it is a subject almost wholly ignored in detail."23 Given its complicated nature, the traffic in enslaved Africans began to draw reformers' attention from a number of different angles. As a branch of commerce, like the trade in cacao or tobacco, it demanded better control within journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 24 The choice of these industries seems to reflect those areas in which the Spanish Crown was already invested. the economic circuits of the Spanish economy. It was characterized by too much contraband and corruption, and foreign traders had been too successful permeating Spanish American markets. Since 1713, when the British gained the asiento, slave trafficking increasingly served as an entrée into other sorts of sideline British contraband trade. And yet at the same time, the slave trade was now suddenly seen as critically important: a prime mover for the development of overseas economies and a source of new populations to work, populate, and defend Spanish territories. In his Reflexiones sobre el comercio español a Indias, the Conde de Campomanes pointed out how crucial an easy slave supply had been, for example, for the growth of gold and diamond mining in Brazil and the vibrant tobacco industry in Virginia and Maryland.24 In fact he called the British asiento of 1713 both "the most intolerable yoke the Spanish nation had ever suffered" and the "worst error" Spanish politics had ever made. By allowing the British to take advantage of contraband trade under the guise of the asiento, Spain had permitted Britain, Campomanes claimed, to ruin its commerce to the West Indies. Furthermore, British and other foreign traders had an interest in not introducing too many Africans into Spanish lands "in order not to increase the agriculture and strength of our colonies." This was most unfortunate, Campomanes pointed out, because unlike Indians, people of African descent served the Crown in other ways, too. For example, he commented that in America mulatos were viewed as Spaniards and proved very useful in military matters. Thus in order to rectify this grave situation, populate Spain's American possessions, and defend and secure them against potential British encroachment, he advocated the founding of a free port for Spanish slave trading on the Canary Islands and the introduction of slaves into American territories free of duties.25
Views such as these were informed and shaped by Cuban creole elites who inserted themselves into the conversation in Spain. In a report commissioned by the Council of the Indies in 1749, the Havana lawyer and alcalde Bernardo Joseph de Urrutia y Matos insisted that only the expansion of the slave trade journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 would remedy Cuba's economic woes. Through their control of the asiento, foreigners not only dominated Cuba's external commerce via contraband but also impeded its development by not providing enough quantity or quality, as he put it, of enslaved Africans for sale.26 Making enslaved Africans "abundant and cheap," he reasoned, would benefit the numerous economic niches where they had proven themselves indispensable: the naval shipyard, maritime trade, the agriculture of tobacco, sugar, and foodstuffs, the curing of hides, mining, and more. In essence, Urrutia y Matos was arguing to make the slave trade to Cuba look more like those to Barbados or Martinique. Notably, he was not yet arguing to make Cuba's diversified economy look more like these islands, with their dominant sugar industries. Instead he emphasized the myriad niches enslaved Africans filled in Cuba's multifaceted pre-sugar-boom economy.27 In 1757 Nicolás de Ribera, a creole subject from Cuba who had established himself in Madrid in his later years, wrote a lengthy description of the island of Cuba for the Spanish king. It brimmed with recommendations no doubt influenced by these discussions at court and in council. He too decried Spain's overlong attachment to a culture of conquest, rather than commerce, and claimed that the current moment had proven that agriculture and industry are "the truly inexhaustible mines."28 He argued that Spanish empire ought to strengthen its industry and agriculture, in Cuba and elsewhere, and even its navigation (as he put it, on the model of New England and Bermuda, whose merchants of course did a great deal of commerce).29
As Ribera saw it, too, the key to reviving Spain's fortunes lay in expanding its population.30 One way to do that was by means of the slave trade. Spain ought journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 to liberalize the slave trade, he argued, as it would not only improve agriculture but also increase the number of its inhabitants overseas, of both African and European descent. According to Ribera, the examples of Barbados, French Saint-Domingue, and Martinique showed the economic benefits of introducing more slaves. He argued, though, that unlike the British, the Spanish were known for better treating their slaves-converting them to Christianity, incorporating them into society, and ultimately making them and their descendants loyal and productive vassals of the Crown.31 Under the Spanish system of slavery, as opposed to the British, according to Ribera, many African-born bozales came to be good Catholics, with an interest in the prosperity of the state. They had wives and children, as well as a peculium, with which many bought their own freedom and even became rich. Remarkably, he found, within just a few years of their arrival in the Americas, bozales learned to speak Spanish, and they even took up arms and defended the territory if they were instructed and trained. "Little does it matter to the State," he wrote, "whether the inhabitants of Cuba be black or white, as long as they work hard and are loyal." The sons of bozales, he wrote, "could only be distinguished from Spaniards by color."32 At least in part, Ribera based his argument for expanding the slave trade on the utility to the state of more free black subjects. This was not as much part of the more or less contemporaneous discourse in Britain and France about the advantages of expanding colonial populations.33 This sanguine view of the potential of people of African descent to be worthy (loyal, Catholic) subjects of and defenders of the Spanish Crown was also strikingly at odds with the kinds of concerns about free blacks that were raised in Cuba after the Haitian Revolution and the island's sugar boom. Rather than emphasize the benefits of free blacks to Spanish empire, Francisco de Arango y Parreño came to see free blacks, and especially free black militias, as a potential danger. In a 1795 report, he warned that whether free or enslaved, "they are all blacks, and more or less have the same complaints and the same motives for living angry with us."34 By contrast, Ribera's line of thinking has its analog in similar writings from the pre-Haitian Revolution era that were primarily concerned with augmenting In a parallel example from Campillo's writings about Mexico, the reformer discussed at great length the necessity of Spain making better use of its vast indigenous population. These views were informed by a visit Campillo made to New Spain while on a naval commission to Havana between 1719 and 1724. The Indians of America, he insisted, should be granted more of their own lands and encouraged to farm. Thus they would provide useful settlers of Spanish lands, economic producers, and markets for Spanish manufactures. Importantly, Campillo promoted this policy as an alternative to increased importation of African slaves, which opened the door to much contraband and dependency on foreign merchants. His ideas hardly went far in practice, yet they demonstrate a burgeoning Iberian interest in exploiting diverse populations in the interest of the Crown, as well as de facto recognition of the spaces that subjects of non-European origins already did or potentially could fill. Additionally, they point to a Spanish effort to distinguish itself from British colonialism, in part an argument about the superiority of Catholic over Protestant models, as well as a White Legend of Spanish rule to counteract the Black one.36
At the same time, these statements by Ribera about the utility of more free black subjects were also shaped by the actions of people of African descent themselves. By the mid-eighteenth century, people of African descent had spent more than two centuries in the Americas practicing trades, buying their freedom and those of others, forming families, serving in the king's militias, defending Spanish possessions, growing rich, and contributing to state treasuries. In some cases, they even passed as little different than their fellow subjects of European descent.37 Through the process of Bourbon reform, this journal of early american history 5 (2015) 
Test Case: Cuba
The British invasion and occupation of Havana in 1762-3 drew Spain's attention to Cuba, highlighted its strategic importance as never before, and placed tremendous pressure on Spanish administrators to develop the island's economy and military defenses better or risk losing it for good. Upon the island's restitution, Spain desperately needed to strengthen the defenses of the island, broker stronger ties with its white elite population there, and set Cuba on a new and more productive path. In addition, Cuba's demographic situation of postconquest native depopulation gave these questions of new sources for its military and labor force heightened urgency. Subsequently, the rapid growth of transatlantic human trafficking and African enslavement in Cuba would have tremendous ramifications for policies vis-à-vis the slave trade that affected much broader territories. Cuba subsequently became the site of a trial run for journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 Shortly after the news of Havana's capture reached Spain, in November of 1762, the counselor Francisco de Craywinckel presented a report to the Crown comparing Britain and Spain and urging the need "to make the most of this disgrace." While the embarrassing loss of Havana demonstrated Britain to be, at the time, "much more powerful than Spain," he did not find the differences between the two realms insurmountable. Britain surpassed Spain in the arts of navigation, commerce, and agriculture, but given some time to remake itself, Craywinckel predicted, Spain would catch up with its rival and throw off "dependence on other states."39 When Spain reclaimed its prized New World stronghold at the end of the Seven Years' War, Charles III sent the Aragonese nobleman, Ambrosio de Funes Villalpando, the Conde de Ricla, to overhaul Cuba's governance and begin reforms of its military and economy. The circle of government and military officials who arrived in Havana with Ricla in 1763 immediately set about strengthening and reorganizing the island's defenses. Upon the restitution of the island to Spanish rule, the strategic value of people of African descent, who had played a critical role in the defense of the island, was immediately apparent. When the engineer Silvestre de Abarca made the rounds of western Cuba inspecting troops and fortifications, he counted more black and mulatto militiamen than white ones.40 Alejandro O'Reilly in turn performed a military review of the island, during which he established four new battalions of militia, including two of free blacks and mulatos. During his short tenure in Cuba, the Captain General Conde de Ricla freed over 150 slaves who had distinguished themselves defending Havana during the British siege,41 sanctioned the importation of up to 7,000 royal slaves to rebuild the city's fortifications,42 journal of early american history 5 (2015) In contrast with these men, of particular concern in the aftermath of events in Cuba was the seeming lackluster defense of the island by the majority of the white creole population. Even more, the Havana elites had displayed an unsettling degree of compliance with and even openness to British rule. Madrid in 1763-4 was the setting for a prolonged, public treason trial for those civil and military leaders of Havana who had failed adequately to defend Havana against British attack. Another trial targeted two members of the Havana city council, Sebastian de Peñalver y Angulo and Gonzalo Recio de Oquendo, who had willingly served as lieutenant governors of British Havana under Lord Albemarle.44 These men, found guilty of treason for cooperating too willingly with the occupiers, had extensive experience and stake in the British slave and contraband journal of early american history 5 (2015) 3-29 trades into Cuba.45 One lesson to be learned from the occupation was this: a long history of trading with the enemy, in slaves and contraband, had undermined the Havana elite's loyalty to Spain. Spain felt an urgent need to diagnose the problems that had led to Cuba's loss and to tie the island more closely to its Spanish sovereign. Ricla was also concerned with making Cuba able to produce enough revenue to pay for the troops, fortifications, naval protection, and administration the island required.46 Consequently, the post-Seven-Years'-War moment presented a unique occasion to put theoretical debates about political economy into practice. To that end, Charles III's envoys in Cuba wrote several reports about development economics for the island of Cuba. These reports provide both a window on political and economic thinking vis-à-vis Spain's most important Caribbean possession, as well as a more general response to Craywinckel's call to meet the British challenge.47 In what was a marked turn from prior policy, all of these reports advocated opening the slave trade to the island.
In his general report of 1764, Alejandro O'Reilly considered the scarcity and high cost of enslaved Africans one of the principal causes of Cuba's economic underdevelopment. Because African slaves were the only workforce in the island's logging, ranching, and agriculture-and particularly in the key industries of sugar and tobacco48-O'Reilly considered them "the most indispensable merchandise in order to make this interesting colony flourish." More slaves would not only produce more revenue for the King but also make Spain's vassals there more loyal to him: as O'Reilly put it, "And when a vassal is rich, what can he fault his Sovereign?"49 Not only did O'Reilly use the explicitly commercial language of "merchandise" to describe African slaves but he also looked for models in the slave trading patterns of Spain's European competitors. He pointed out that the Spanish policy of monopoly contracts had impeded, not aided, the supplying of Cuba with enslaved laborers. "The French, English, and Dutch," he wrote, "whose establishments on the coast of Africa assure them that they obtain blacks with great convenience, know how greatly the happiness of their colonies depends journal of early american history 5 (2015) on the introduction of them, and far from imposing tributes, or measures that make it difficult, they have encouraged it, and always protect the trade through as many means as the government can." O'Reilly mentioned that during the British occupation of Havana, the enemy commander Lord Albemarle had imposed a 40 peso tribute on each slave imported, "which he has done to make difficult the introduction of what was most convenient and necessary for the island."50 Indeed O'Reilly saw Albemarle's restrictions on slave imports as connected to rivalry between British and Spanish Caribbean isles. In his mind, the way to develop the island of Cuba and bind its elite to Spain was simple: the expansion of the slave trade, state support of slave purchase, and the removal of duties on imported Africans. Writing from Havana in 1768, the Belgian-born military engineer Agustín Crame, who accompanied Ricla and O'Reilly to Cuba, reported similar conclusions to the Council of the Indies. Like O'Reilly, he had taken part in the military review of the island. Accompanying his report was the most detailed map of the island ever before produced. As Crame saw it, Cuba had great potential for both agriculture and commerce,51 yet as he reasoned, agricultural zones required a different political economy than mining regions. "I am very aware of the rigorous prohibition of our laws against the least commerce with foreign colonies…But will it always be necessary to subject all of America to one law? Will a land of mines whose natives extract rich metals be the same as an agricultural colony that cannot flourish without slaves?"52
According to Crame's prescription for this new model of "agricultural colony" in Cuba, abundant numbers of enslaved Africans were needed, as no European migrants would willingly submit to the rigors of labor in the field. Nor would it conform with the spirit of Spanish laws to force families of Indians to migrate to Cuba for this work, an option he considered but dismissed.53 As he saw it, prohibitions against trade with foreigners should be cast aside, in order to meet the island's needs for African slaves. In his words, the "passion" Cuba's inhabitants had for supplying themselves with slaves could not even be contemplated; hence, in a strange twist of language, "blacks were the worst enemy that trade prohibitions could possibly have." As Crame saw it, a political economy designed to prevent the leakage of mineral wealth from Spain's American territories had been rendered obsolete by the exigencies of slavedriven agriculture. In essence, according to this logic, it was the slave trade and the perceived necessity of more enslaved Africans for every aspect of Cuba's development that dismantled the logic of mercantilist trade prohibitions.54 Borrowing new kinds of metaphors from manufacturing and from Spain's European rivals, Crame wrote that "blacks" were "the most useful machines for agriculture." Both "machines" and "prime material" for colonial economies, once "put into motion cultivating the land they take on a value much greater than they cost initially."55 By his optimistic calculations, adding just 100 slaves to Havana would generate 200,000 pesos of sugar.56 Just as Britain, he argued, needed to acquire raw wool for its cloth industry, so did Spain need to buy slaves for its expanding agriculture of tobacco and sugar.57
Even as he used jumbled, dehumanizing language of machinery and raw materials, Crame's report also grappled with the paradoxes of this new way of thinking about Africans in Spain's overseas territories. His discussion gets at the heart of this dissonance between new and old modes of thought. As he acknowledged, blacks were not just "machines" but also "humans," and although "obscured by the barbarism of their initial education and oppressed by slavery, aspire for liberty, and are capable of all, or most, of the passions of the rest of mankind."58 This was the crux of the problem: to see them as "machines" broke from several centuries of precedent, in which the Spanish Crown and Church recognized the personhood of enslaved Africans and in fact justified the African slave trade with the logic that it was better to live a slave in Catholic lands than free in pagan ones.59 To disrupt that treatment might induce rebellion and revolt.60
Yet in contrast to the way that thinking about slavery and the slave trade would evolve after the Haitian Revolution,61 Crame voiced the notion then current in Cuba that for a number of reasons, more slaves equaled more security. As Crame saw it, by comparison with French Saint-Domingue, Martinique, and Jamaica-islands "covered" with blacks and especially slaves-Cuba had much room to increase the number and percentage of slaves without incurring any undue risks. Crame acknowledged that Jamaica had faced slave rebellions (most recently in Tacky's Revolt of 1760-1, or the Coromantee Wars), but, as he wrote, "in our constitution obedience is more certain than the English one."62 In fact, to his mind, blacks were useful for many ends, even in warfare, and in times of peace a number of them should be prepared for that labor.63 In this instance, Crame was expressing a familiar, even if still remarkable, degree of confidence about the unique and superior forms of Spanish slavery, the utility of black militias, the remoteness of the possibility of slave rebellion, and the ease of putting it down. He also foreshadowed an important argument prevalent in nineteenth-century Cuba about the comparative obedience of the Cuban slave and mildness of the institution on the island. 64 Historians total number to be sold and setting a higher price than had been the norm under the Royal Havana Company monopoly.66 The reasons Crame cited for expanding the slave trade were political (ensuring the satisfaction and hence loyalty of the island's elite), military (populating the island and providing manpower for its defense), and economic (curbing contraband and developing the agricultural sector, which would drive further settlement and provide revenue for the Crown). Crame noted that inhabitants of Cuba were well aware of the development their island lacked and the freedom of commerce it needed. Striking an ominous tone, given the recent behavior of Havana elite during the British occupation, he wrote, "Never has a developing city rebelled."67 Echoing a point made by O'Reilly, Crame shared the concern that the Havana elite's desire for more slaves was so acute it might even trump their loyalty to Spain.
O'Reilly and Crame were not the only voices advocating Spanish expansion of the slave trade. In the influx of reports from Cuba in the 1760s, a central point often repeated was that the supply of slaves to the island of Cuba, and Spanish empire more broadly,68 needed to be expanded. Another plan for Cuba's development from the late 1760s considered expanding the slave trade to at least 3-4,000 Africans per year, a measure that would ensure supposedly "marvelous progress" for the island.69 Like Ribera's, this proposal also imagined a broader slave trade meeting demand throughout Cuba's diversified economy, but without necessarily remaking it. This report argued for expanding the slave trade to Cuba by pointing out that blacks and mulatos, both free and enslaved, composed almost all the artisans, workers, and day laborers on the island. "They are the ones that perform the skilled trades…and from whom are composed the battalions of militias of their name newly created for the defense of the island. Ultimately, upon them depends entirely the greater or lesser happiness the island achieves, and in the case of their lacking in number, they would reduce everything here to a pitiful embryo."70 Here as elsewhere, the language employed indicated that Africans were seen as necessary to grow and develop virtually every aspect of Spanish settlement.
As these reports from Cuba demonstrate, the pressures of imperial competition had generated several new ways of thinking and talking about the importance of people of African descent to Spanish empire. In Cuba, after the end of the Seven Years' War, they also ushered in a new set of measures and policies, as well as the expansion of the slave trade to the island. Indeed the realization had set in that if Spain were to satisfy the demands of the inhabitants of Cuba and consolidate its hold over the island, against both internal and external threats, it would have to secure its own direct supply of Africans, as the French, British, and Portuguese did. This pressure for expanding the slave trade exerted from Cuba's private and public sectors, combined with that applied from Peru, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico, contributed to Spanish authorities making a concerted effort to intensify the slave trade.
This transformation of political thought catalyzed the implementation of a number of new policies with regard to African slavery and slave trading in the period from the 1760s through to 1807. The slave trade served as a new bonding agent between center and peripheries, as Spanish authorities committed themselves to experimenting with ways to expand access to enslaved African laborers in America. Before the declaration of "free trade in slaves" in 1789 and the use of bounties to promote the trade, a series of other measures were introduced. These included the establishment of a Spanish slave trading monopoly company, the Compañía gaditana de negros, in 1765; the dramatic escalation of the number of royal slaves; the acquisition of territory meant to serve as Spain's first slave trading entrepôt in West Africa in 1778; and the attempt between 1784 and 1790 to codify laws for the first time in the long history of Spanish slaveholding with regard to not only enslaved Africans but also all people of African descent in its American possessions.71 Cumulatively, these new policies helped set the stage for Spain's nineteenth-century empire, part of the dramatic expansion of an industrial mode of slavery-i.e., slavery with railroads-that occurred simultaneously in the Spanish Caribbean, Brazil, and the u.s. South.72
Conclusion
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Spanish government radically reoriented its thinking on the issue of the transatlantic slave trade and African slavery in its American territories. The dramatic expansion of slavery in Spanish empire was not an unforeseen consequence of shifts in broader global economies, but rather a conscious policy planned for and debated throughout Spanish empire. It grew out of a new perception of how nations built wealth arrived at amid a climate of imperial competition. These new ideas about large scale slavery were at the heart of the Bourbon reforms, Spain's process of "rival modernization" across the eighteenth century.73 This idea of the connection between slavery and modernity would engender a political economy of exploitation that persisted and expanded into the nineteenth century, the century of abolition and of the institution's apogee.
The discourse that governed this transition-first in thought, then in policy-was shaped by the example of Spain's European rivals and shifting ideas about the relationships between slavery, the slave trade, the defense of empire, and the production of wealth. In turn, these ideas were worked out in a circular discourse moving between Spanish political economists and officials and subjects overseas, engaging with the actions of people of African descent themselves. As much as Spanish political writers borrowed from their rivals in seeking to expand slavery and slave trading in their overseas possessions, they also took great pains to distinguish and justify the unique and, as they saw it, preferable modes of their own version of African slavery. This rhetoric demonstrates that imperial policies were not developed in a vacuum, but in unending conversation and competition with those of their competitors, as well as in response to new developments and the raising of multiple voices overseas.
There was, of course, an appreciable gap between the rhetoric justifying practices of transatlantic African slavery and their lived realities. The presence and persistence of this discourse, however, reminds us of the relentless need to self-justify among European monarchies, and the backwards-looking rationalizations given for new departures in policy. Ultimately, these policies by necessity also had to take into account the spaces that people of African descent had already carved out for themselves and the rights and privileges the Crown had expressed an interest in protecting over the many prior centuries of Spanish expansion. By the mid-eighteenth century, for example, there was already an appreciable population of African descent and a sizable free population of color in the Americas. Many of their number had bought their freedom through self-purchase, or coartación, a policy that the Crown protected, and willingly served in the King's militias. His own policies and justifications would have to be elaborated in dialogue with these precedents and unfolding events overseas. Indeed all of the language of the 1750s -80s, arguing for a new departure in Spanish slavery, was shaped by both the actions of these individuals and the legacy of these older modes of enslavement in Iberian worlds.
It was only later that the older language that governed this dramatic expansion of slavery was rendered obsolete by the dramatic economic, demographic, and social transformations it set into motion. By the 1790s, which saw the multiple effects of the Haitian Revolution on the island of Cuba, including the sugar boom, the sugar elite had grown rich and powerful enough to begin to redirect the imperial center's declarations about the proper role and place of people of African descent in Spanish empire. Most dramatically, they rallied together, along with planters in Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo, to reject as too lenient the new legal code for free blacks and enslaved Africans the Crown tried to introduce.74 At this time, the language used to refer to people of African descent in Cuba, and the modes of African slavery on the island, began to look more like what had reigned in the French and British West Indies during
